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WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 In the course of its investigation of a failed 
depository institution, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
issued a subpoena to former directors of the bank directing them 
to produce a wide variety of their personal financial records as 
well as those of family members.  The district court required the 
directors to produce only their own records, showing additions or 
reductions in their assets.  Rejecting the directors' claims of 
privacy violations, we will affirm the district court's order. 
 Natalie I. Koether and Sidney F. Wentz were directors 
of The Howard Savings Bank of Livingston, New Jersey, which was 
declared insolvent on October 2, 1992.  On that same day, the 
FDIC was appointed receiver. 
 In April 1993, the FDIC issued an "Order of 
Investigation" pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1820(c) and 12 C.F.R.  
§ 303.9(i)(2), targeting former officers and directors of the 
bank.  Four purposes were cited in the order:  (1) determining 
whether the individuals may be liable as a result of any action 
or inaction that could have affected the bank; (2) assessing 
whether the pursuit of litigation would be cost effective by 
considering the ability of the individuals to satisfy a judgment; 
(3) establishing whether the FDIC should seek to avoid transfers 
  
of interests or incurrences of obligations; and (4) ascertaining 
whether the FDIC should seek attachments of assets.   The order 
authorized FDIC representatives to issue subpoenas duces tecum.   
 The directors, together with other bank principals, 
were served with notices to appear for depositions and ordered to 
produce documents in some twenty-eight different categories 
covering the six-year period preceding October 1992.  Included 
were records in their possession pertaining to bank operations.  
In addition, the subpoena demanded production of such documents 
as financial statements and credit applications of the directors 
and their spouses; records of any bank accounts of the directors 
and those maintained by "any member of [their] immediate 
famil[ies]," including canceled checks and bank statements; tax 
returns; title and registration papers for motor vehicles, boats, 
and airplanes; pension and profit-sharing plans in which the 
directors or their spouses had an interest; insurance policies; 
and records of inheritance, and other such gifts received by the 
directors and "any member of [their] immediate famil[ies]." 
 The directors timely complied with the requests for 
documents having any connection with their activities as 
officials of the bank, but refused to produce their personal 
records and those of their families.   
 In seeking enforcement of the subpoena in the district 
court, the FDIC presented the affidavit of James M. Judd, an 
investigations specialist for the FDIC.  It stated that the 
documents were necessary to enable the FDIC to determine the 
nature and extent of any losses sustained by the bank because of 
  
negligence or breach of fiduciary duty by the directors, and to 
establish whether it would be cost-effective to pursue any such 
claims.  The affidavit alleged that the directors had approved 
transactions that resulted in losses of millions of dollars and 
that the transactions "appear[ed] to exhibit inadequate 
documentation, unsafe concentrations of credit, poor credit 
administration, and inadequate supervision of management."  
Finally, the affidavit asserted that the directors had been 
"warned repeatedly" by bank examiners about lax business 
practices at the bank, but that the deficiencies were not 
corrected.   
 The district court conducted a hearing and, at its 
conclusion, ordered the directors to produce all records that 
demonstrated increases or depletions in, or transfers of, their 
assets.  As the judge explained,  
 "I do not sanction an inquiry whose sole 
purpose is to find out whether these folks 
have money to respond to a judgment, if one 
should eventuate. . . . [M]y requirement of 
document production . . . is narrow enough to 
specifically address transfers or sudden 
accretions or depletions of wealth. . . . I 
feel that those purposes are reasonably 
within the power of the FDIC, and I feel that 
what I have ordered is a limited incursion 
into the financial affairs that is tailored 
  
to match up with the purposes that I have 
articulated."   
 In a formal order filed a few days later, the court 
denied the FDIC's request for enforcement of the subpoena duces 
tecum, except that the directors were instructed to produce: 
 "(a) All documents which relate to any increases or 
depletions of assets, or any transfer of assets, for the period 
October 1986 through the date of this Order; and  
  (b) All financial statements prepared by 
or on behalf of [the directors] from October 
1986 through the date of this Order."   
The court then granted a stay of its order pending resolution of 
this appeal. 
 The directors now contend that (1) the FDIC's statutory 
powers do not permit an unwarranted intrusion into their personal 
affairs, (2) the subpoenas were issued for an improper purpose, 
particularly in the context of "cost effectiveness" of potential 
litigation that might be initiated by the FDIC, and (3) the 
documents sought are not relevant.  The directors also complain 
that the FDIC offered no grounds for suspicion of wrongdoing to 
justify issuance of a subpoena, and hence, it violates the Fourth 
Amendment.   
 Preliminarily, we observe that the district court's 
order substantially narrows the subpoena in two significant 
aspects.  First, the demand for production of documents of the 
directors' spouses and immediate family members is no longer 
effective.  Second, the documents that the directors must produce 
  
are limited to those pertaining to additions or diminutions of 
their own assets.   
 As an appellate court, we will affirm an order 
enforcing an agency's subpoena unless we conclude that the 
district court has abused its discretion.  NLRB v. Frazier, 966 
F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1992).  To determine whether there has 
been an abuse of discretion, the reviewing court must consider 
whether the district court's decision was based on irrelevant 
factors or on clearly erroneous findings of fact, and whether 
there has been a clear error of judgment.  Id.  "[T]he district 
court's role is not that of a mere rubber stamp, but of an 
independent reviewing authority called upon to insure the 
integrity of the proceeding."  Wearly v. FTC, 616 F.2d 662, 665 
(3d Cir. 1980).   
 To obtain enforcement of an administrative subpoena, 
the agency must show that the investigation will be conducted 
pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry is relevant, 
that the information demanded is not already within the agency's 
possession, and that the administrative steps required by the 
statute have been followed.  United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 
48, 57-58 (1964); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 
652 (1950).  The demand for information must not be unreasonably 
broad or burdensome.  United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
788 F.2d 164, 166 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 It is not necessary, in most instances, that the agency 
make a showing of liability before seeking to enforce a subpoena.  
As the Supreme Court has observed, an agency "`can investigate 
  
merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just 
because it wants assurance that it is not.'"  Powell, 379 U.S. at 
57 (quoting Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 642-43).  The subpoenaed 
party bears the heavy burden of establishing an abuse of the 
court's process.  United States v. Cortese, 614 F.2d 914, 919 (3d 
Cir. 1980). 
 When personal documents of individuals, as contrasted 
with business records of corporations, are the subject of an 
administrative subpoena, privacy concerns must be considered.  
See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).  Thus, in United 
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 
1980), where a governmental agency sought production of employee 
medical records, we listed as relevant factors such matters as 
the type of record requested, the information that it might 
contain, the potential for harm and subsequent nonconsensual 
disclosure, the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized 
disclosure, the degree of need for access, the specificity of the 
agency's statutory mandate, and the presence of recognizable 
public interests justifying access.  See also In re McVane, 44 
F.3d 1127, 1137 (2d Cir. 1995) (agency subpoenas directed at 
individuals do implicate privacy rights); Resolution Trust Corp. 
v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same).     
 12 U.S.C. § 1818(n) supplies the FDIC with the power to 
issue subpoenas duces tecum.  The permissible purposes are set 
out in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(I)(i) as "carrying out any power, 
authority, or duty with respect to an insured depository 
institution (including determining any claim against the 
  
institution and determining and realizing upon any asset of any 
person in the course of collecting money due the institution)."  
The FDIC is empowered to avoid fraudulent asset transfers, 12 
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(17), assert claims against directors and 
officers, id. § 1821(k), and seek court orders attaching assets, 
id. § 1821(d)(18). 
 Against this sweeping grant of power to the FDIC, we 
consider the challenges mounted by the directors.  As noted 
earlier, the district court -- entertaining grave doubts about 
the breadth of the subpoena, the relevance of documents of family 
members, and the burdens of production imposed on the directors  
-- substantially reduced the original scope of the subpoena.  The 
FDIC has not challenged the district court's order, and as the 
record now stands, the directors object only to producing those 
personal records that would show additions and subtractions to 
their private assets.   
  In applying the factors we identified in 
Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 578, we observe at the outset that 
there is a significant public interest in promptly resolving the 
affairs of insolvent banks on behalf of their creditors and 
depositors, many of whom have lost significant sums of money and 
are often left with little hope for recovery.  Personal financial 
records have never been as tightly guarded as "information 
concerning one's body."  Id. at 577.  Subpoenas and summonses of 
the Internal Revenue Service requiring production of such records 
have routinely been enforced.  See, e.g., Pickel v. United 
States, 746 F.2d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 1984).   
  
 The FDIC has shown a reasonable need for gaining access 
to the directors' records in order to determine whether they 
reveal breaches of fiduciary duties through the improper 
channeling of bank funds for personal benefit.  Moreover, the 
directors have not produced any evidence to show that the 
information contained in their personal financial records "is of 
such a high degree of sensitivity that the intrusion could be 
considered severe or that the [directors] are likely to suffer 
any adverse effects from disclosure to [FDIC] personnel."  
Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 579.  Finally, we observe that 
regulatory provisions have been promulgated to guard against 
subsequent unauthorized disclosure of the subpoenaed information.  
See 12 C.F.R. pts. 309 & 310.   
 Accordingly, we conclude that the strong public 
interest in safeguarding the FDIC's legislative mandate outweighs 
the minimal intrusion into the privacy that surrounds the 
directors' personal financial records and any accompanying 
burdens of production. 
 In balancing competing interests in this case, we 
cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in 
concluding that the limited investigation it approved is relevant 
to the proper functions of the FDIC.  Without impugning in any 
way the integrity of the directors, it must be observed that the 
allegations of mishandling of certain loans by the bank furnishes 
a proper basis for an investigation into (1) whether the 
individuals might be liable, (2) whether there might be transfers 
  
that should be avoided, or (3) whether the FDIC should seek 
attachment of assets. 
 We do not resolve the directors' contention that the 
FDIC must assert an articulable suspicion of liability before 
pursuing an inquiry into the cost-effectiveness of potential 
litigation against them.  The directors rely heavily on McVane 
and Walde.  However, in McVane, the Court found an adequate basis 
for enforcing the subpoena against directors even as to the cost-
effectiveness factor.  Walde did sustain an objection to the 
disclosure of personal records of certain directors for that 
limited purpose, but we need not discuss that case further in 
view of the fact that the district court's order here is 
sustainable on any one of the FDIC's other three objectives.   
 The directors also contend that the district court's 
order is too vague because, literally, a purchase of groceries 
would be included within the scope of the subpoena as a depletion 
of personal assets.  At oral argument, counsel for the FDIC 
suggested that this difficulty might be avoided by reading into 
the order the $5,000 limitation on items stated in the subpoena 
itself.  That appears to us to be a reasonable reading of the 
district court's order, but if it is not satisfactory to the 
parties, they may request further clarification from the district 
judge. 
 The order of the district court will be affirmed.  
  
 
